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The Appropriate Remedy For Failing to
Comply With Constitutional Mandates
in a Civil In Rem Forfeiture of Real
Property
"Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property
rights. ,,
I. Introduction
The federal government's statutory right3 to forfeit property
involved in a criminal act implicates a broad range of constitutional
issues. In 1993, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property,' the Supreme Court addressed the requirements of the
Due Process Clause when the government brings an action of
forfeiture against real property.6 The Court held that the owner of
1. "Constitutional Mandates" refers to an owner's right to receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard in the forfeiture of real property. These mandates
were codified in 2000. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510
U.S. 43, 61 (1993); 18 U.S.C. § 985 (2000).
2 Good, 510 U.S. at 61.
3. The federal government's right to forfeit any property is necessarily
founded in statutory authority. See United States v. Charles D. Kaier Co., 61 F.2d
160, 162 (3d Cir. 1931). As of 1998, there were over 140 civil forfeiture statutes in
the United States that covered a broad range of violations. See ASSET
FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 1-1 (1998). On April 25, 2000,
President Clinton signed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (hereinafter "the
Reform Act") into law. See David B. Smith, Feature: An Insider's View of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 24 CHAMPION 28, 28 (June 2000). The
Reform Act has significantly changed the landscape of civil forfeiture.
4. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (discussing forfeiture of
an automobile in the context of the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause);
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (discussing the Eighth Amendment's
excessive fines clause and its effect on drug-related forfeitures); United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the double
jeopardy implications of forfeiture and the concurrent prosecution against the
owner for the criminal offense).
5. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
6. See id. at 46. The reasoning of the majority in Good will be extensively
discussed in Part III.
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real property was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the government could legally seize the property
The decision in Good, and its subsequent codification in the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act,8 altered the procedure by which
the government brings an action of forfeiture against the res in a
civil forfeiture involving real property. Formerly, the government
would acquire a warrant of arrest and seize any allegedly forfeitable
property in order to assert jurisdiction.9 This warrant was obtained
in an ex parte hearing: the government official simply filed an
affidavit alleging probable cause of forfeiture." Upon finding such
probable cause, the magistrate issued the warrant and the property
was seized." Secondly, an official complaint for forfeiture was filed
with the district court. 2 The seizure placed the owner on notice of
the forfeiture."
The Good decision held that the government could not seize
real property without affording the owner notice and an
opportunity to be heard.'4 The government obtains jurisdiction and
control over real property by posting the property and providing
notice to the owners. 5 These changes were codified in the Reform
Act.
16
7. See id. at 63.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 985(b) (2000) ("[R]real property that is the subject of a
civil forfeiture action shall not be seized before entry of an order of forfeiture.").
9. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 2-15 (1998).
Before a forfeiture action may be commenced, all property must first be brought,
whether actually or constructively, within the control and jurisdiction of the court.
See Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992). Only after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the res is the forfeiture complaint filed. See id.
The procedures used both before and after Good, as well as the changes
implemented by the Reform Act, are discussed in Part II.




14. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,48-62
(1993).
15. See id. at 58-59 ("In the case of real property, the res may be brought
within the reach of the court simply by posting notice on the property and leaving
a copy of the process with the occupant."). See also 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) (2000)
(requiring the government to initiate the forfeiture action against real property by
filing a complaint in forfeiture, posting notice on the property, and serving notice
on the property owner).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 985(c) (2000). If the government properly follows the
procedure "it shall not be necessary for the court to issue an arrest warrant in rem,
or to take any other action to establish in rem jurisdiction over the property." Id.
at 985(c)(3). Because the requirements of Section 985 are commonly associated
with the Supreme Court's decision in Good, this comment will refer to a violation
as a "Good violation."
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Before the Reform Act, the circuits had split on the
appropriate remedy if the government seized real property without
providing adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. One circuit
held that the cause of action should be dismissed. 7 Other circuits
applied the exclusionary rule to any evidence recovered in the
seizure, awarded damages to the owner, or a combination of both.'8
This comment will focus on the appropriate remedy in the event
that the government seizes real property without following the
proper procedures. This remedy will be addressed in terms of the
case law following Good and the Reform Act.
Although the Supreme Court requirements in Good, as
reflected in the Reform Act, are not particularly complex, this issue
will likely continue to be the cause of litigation and controversy. In
United States v. Property Identified as Lot Numbered 71819 the
government brought an action of forfeiture against two parcels of
property believed to have been purchased with the proceeds of
drug sales.' Prior to filing the complaint, the government posted
the property, printed notice in the newspaper, and filed a lis
pendens against the property.2' One of the owners, Mrs. Honesty,
contended notice of the action was not received until she was
notified of the lis pendens.22
At the time the forfeiture complaint was filed, both properties
were for sale.23 The real estate agent listing the residence received a
telephone call from someone claiming to be a federal agent who
told the broker to forget the sale.24 A release of the other property
17. The Eighth Circuit dismisses the complaint with permission to re-file if the
statute of limitations has not expired. See United States v. One Parcel of Real
Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994). The
District Court of the District of Columbia has also taken this view. See United
States v. Property Identified as Lot 718, 20 F. Supp.2d 27, 39 (D.D.C. 1998).
18. These jurisdictions are comprised of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 927, 931-32
(4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Real Property Located at 1184 Drycreek Rd., 174
F.3d 720, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. All Assets and Equipment of
West Side Building Corp., 58 F.3d 1181, 1193 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Real
Property Located at 20832 Big Rock Drive, 51 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. 408 Peyton Road, 162 F.3d 644, 652 (11th Cir. 1998).
19. 20 F. Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 1998).
20. The laundered drug money violates 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(D)(i). See id.
at 28. The property was forfeitable under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(A). See id.
21. See id. at 29.
22. See Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.2d at 29. She subsequently filed an
answer to the complaint and a verified claim to the properties. See id.
23. See id. at 29.
24. See id.
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was negotiated and that property was sold; the proceeds of the sale,
however, were kept in escrow.25 As a result of not receiving those
funds, Mrs. Honesty fell behind on the mortgage payments on the
residence and the bank indicated an intent to foreclose.26 The
government allegedly offered to remove the lis pendens, in order
that the wife could avoid a disadvantageous foreclosure sale, in
exchange for the escrow account.
27
The District Court for the District of Columbia held this was
an improper seizure of the residence because of the control asserted
over the property, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the lack of
a compelling need for the government to move quickly.28 After
holding that a seizure had taken place, the court had to devise a
remedy.29 The proper remedy for owners such as Mrs. Honesty is a
question that must be addressed in light of the history of forfeiture,
the proceedings associated with a forfeiture action, and the
reasoning of the Good decision."
Therefore, in addressing the foregoing question, Part II of this
comment will discuss the relevant history, procedure and theory of
forfeiture. Part III will contain analysis and discussion of the Good
decision as well as the relevant provisions of the Reform Act. Part
IV will analyze the competing rationales of the circuits and
conclude that the correct view is that of the majority. Finally, Part
V will analyze the new scheme that was promulgated by Congress
in the Reform Act.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 29-30.
27. See Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.2d at 32-33.
28. See id. at 35-36. The court extensively discussed the type of control the
government exerted over the property and concluded: "Honesty was left with two
choices: capitulate to the government's settlement proposal, or face imminent
eviction." See id. at 36. The Reform Act would seem to somewhat undermine this
decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 985(b)(2) (2000) ("The filing of a lis pendens and the
execution of a writ of entry for the purpose of conducting an inspection and
inventory of the property shall not be considered a seizure under this
subsection.").
29. See Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.2d at 38. The District Court of the
District of Columbia required dismissal of the action with leave to re-file if the
statute of limitations permitted. See id. at 40.
30. This comment's scope is limited to evaluating the rationale of the
competing views and discussing which remedy is more appropriate in light of
Good. The reasoning of the circuits is extensively discussed, while the underlying
purposes of remedies and comparisons to other Due Process violations are left for
another day. Moreover, although the primary focus of this comment is not a
critique of the limits or benefits of the Reform Act, the major provisions that affect
this topic will be discussed and the likely legislative remedy provided by the Act is
addressed.
2000] FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES 133
II. Background: the History, Procedure and Theory of Civil In
Rem Forfeiture
A. Obtaining Perspective: a Brief History of Forfeiture
A brief history of the origins of civil in rem forfeiture is helpful
in exploring the issue addressed in this comment.31 These historical
origins explain some of the legal fictions that form the foundation
for the government's cause of action.32 Distinguishing in personam
forfeiture also serves to stress the underlying theory of civil in rem
forfeiture: the guilt of the property as opposed to the guilt of the
33owner.
The Supreme Court, agreeing with most historians, traces the
first concepts of forfeiture to ancient Greece and Rome, as well as
to Judaic law.34 United States forfeiture can be traced to the
common law of early eighteenth century England.35 This common
law provided for three types of forfeiture: deodand,36 statutory or in
rem forfeiture, and forfeiture consequent to attainder or in
personam forfeiture.37
Underlying the deodand was the Biblical concept that a
possession which facilitated an evil act became "tainted" and
31. Although the historical perspective seems somewhat attenuated to a
discussion of modem due process rights, by comparing the various methods of
forfeiture, and the development of the theories, the reasoning of forfeiture
decisions becomes clearer. A mass of information is available concerning the
academic debate over the continued viability of forfeiture as a law enforcement
tool. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of
Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
911, 927-942, 977 (1996) (examining the traditional justifications for civil forfeiture
and concluding that they have no relevancy to modem society). For a more
complete discussion of the historical origins of civil forfeiture: Brad A. Chapman
& Kenneth W. Pearson, Comment, The Drug War and Real Estate Forfeiture
Under 21 U.S.C. sec. 881: The "Innocent" Lienholder's Rights, 21 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 2127 (1990).
32. See infra notes 72-77 (discussing the theories that underlie the modern civil
in rem action).
33. See Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581
(1931).
34. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-1
(1974); Bruce A. Baird and Carolyn P. Vinson, Rico Pretrial Restraints and Due
Process: The Lessons of Princton/Newport, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009, 1010 n.2
(1990).
35. See Baird and Vinson, supra note 34, at 1010 n.2.
36. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-1. Deodand has Latin origins, Deo
dandum, which means, "to be given to God." See id. at 680, n. 16.
37. See Baird and Vinson, supra note 34, at 1010 n.2.
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should be destroyed.3" The deodand, adopting this concept,
provided that the instrument of a man's death should be forfeited
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the owner. 9 The deodand
was never specifically adopted in the United States.
Unlike the deodand, statutory forfeiture was adopted in the
United States and is widely used." Statutory forfeiture provides
that objects used in a criminal offense are "guilty" and, therefore,
forfeitable. 1 The action initiated against the property is inde-
pendent of any criminal proceedings that may be brought against
the criminal offender.42 The statutory forfeiture of the English
common law was limited to violations of customs, revenue, and
admiralty laws 3.4 The forfeiture laws of the United States, however,
have a broader spectrum of violations that may be used as a basis of
forfeiture 4
In personam forfeiture was used in the English common law
upon conviction of treason or a felony. Unlike statutory
forfeiture, the accused's conviction of the criminal offense
precipitated the forfeiture of all her personal property; her death
resulted in the forfeiture of all real property.46
38. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81 ("if an ox gore a man or a woman,
and they die, he shall be stoned: and his flesh shall not be eaten" (quoting Exodus
21:28)). But see Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspective on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46
TEMP. L. Q. 169 (1973) (questioning the applicability of the Biblical quote to the
tainting of a piece of property).
39. See Baird and Vinson, supra note 34, at 1010 n.2.
40. See id. Statutory forfeiture is widely known as civil in rem forfeiture in the
United States.
41. See id. See also Calero-Toledo , 416 U.S. at 682.
42. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 ("The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing;
and this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se .... The
practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the
proceeding in rem stands independent of and wholly unaffected by any criminal
proceeding in personam." (quoting The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-5 (1827))).
43. See Baird and Vinson, supra note 34, at 1010 n. 2.
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1999) (listing the various properties that are
forfeitable).
45. See Baird and Vinson, supra note 34, at 1010 n. 2.
46. See id. Note that statutory forfeiture is not dependent on the conviction of
the owner of the criminal offense. See Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (noting that the statutory forfeiture is no
part of the punishment for the criminal offense). Compare. United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that in personam forfeiture requires
the defendant's conviction), with Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (noting that civil in rem forfeiture does not require the
defendant's conviction).
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Although the Reform Act made major revisions to forfeiture
proceedings, the underlying theories of forfeiture remain
unchanged. Some argue that this significantly undermines the
effectiveness of the Act 7
B. Modern Forfeiture: The Procedure and the Fictions
This section provide a background for the forfeiture actions
brought against real property. Generally, two steps are necessary in
a forfeiture action. First, the property is brought, whether actually
or constructively, within the jurisdiction and control of the court.48
Second, a judicial proceeding is held to determine the government's
rights in the property.4 9 These proceedings will be discussed briefly
and only in general terms."
1. Asserting Jurisdiction and Control Over the Res--All
property, regardless of the type, must be brought within the control
of the court. 1 Oftentimes the method by which the government
47. See generally David Benjamin Ross, Comments and Notes: Civil
Forfeiture: A Fiction That Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259 (2001);
Brant C. Hadaway, Comment: Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of
Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81 (October 2000). But see Smith, supra note 3, at
28-29 (arguing that "the [Reform] Act is a remarkably well-crafted piece of
legislation that carries through most of the reform agenda without unduly
trammeling law enforcement's use of forfeiture as an effective crime control
weapon").
48. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 2-1 (1998) (noting
that seizure brings the property within the court's jurisdiction); United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 58 (1993).
49. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 4-1 et seq. (1998).
Some property is subject to administrative or summary forfeiture. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. §§ 1602-21 (1999) (authorizing administrative forfeitures by a governmental
agency that has seized property without judicial involvement); 21 U.S.C. § 881(f)
(1999) (listing toxic or hazardous raw material or products and their containers as
contraband per se subject to summary forfeiture). This eliminates the need for
involvement by the courts other than appellate review. The statutory language
which authorizes such seizures, however, limits the two methods. See id. Only
property which the possession or production of, without more, is subject to
summary forfeiture. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(f), (g)(1) (1999); One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965). Administrative forfeitures are
likewise limited. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1999) (noting that property may be seized if
the value does not exceed $500,000, its importation is illegal, it is a conveyance
used to transport or store controlled substances, or it is a monetary instrument
within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(3)).
50. Such proceedings have limited significance to the issue addressed in this
comment because once an adversarial hearing is held the requirements of Good
are satisfied. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,
62 (1993).
51. See id. See also Good, 510 U.S. at 57-58 ("And as we have noted last
Term, fairly read, The Brig Ann simply restates the rule that the court must have
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initiates a forfeiture proceeding is by seizure of the property. 2
Before the Court's decision in Good, the government would seize
all property, whether personal or real, by a warrant procured and
executed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.53  The seizure
establishes the appropriate judicial forum, brings the property
within the actual control of the court and establishes the court's
jurisdiction over the property.
A Fourth Amendment warrant is obtained by submitting an
application for the seizure of the particular property and a sworn
affidavit setting forth the facts that provide probable cause for the
forfeiture. 4 The magistrate then issues a warrant of seizure after
reviewing the submitted materials and determining that the facts
are sufficient to establish probable cause. The government then
seizes the property, pursuant to the warrant, and holds the property
until the forfeiture hearing. 6
After the Good decision, and its codification in the Reform
Act, the government is required to have a pre-seizure hearing, as
well as give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the owner of
the property. 7 This is a greater burden on the government than the
former procedure which required only the showing of probable
cause. The court's jurisdiction and constructive control is now
asserted over real property by means of posting the property and
giving notice of the hearing. 8 Hence, this posting procedure
replaces seizure and gives the court jurisdiction and constructive
control over the property.9 The property may only be seized after
actual or constructive control of the res when an in rem suit is initiated." (quoting
Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992))).
52. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 2-1 (1998) (noting
that the seizure brings the property within the jurisdiction of the court).
53. See id. See also CONST. AMEND. 4 ("The people have the right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause."). In some situations, and absent exigent circumstances, the
government is required to hold a pre-seizure hearing if there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area. See, e.g., GM Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977). This is somewhat parallel to the requirements of a pre-
seizure hearing after Good when real property is being seized. See Good 510 U.S.
at 57-62.
54. See In re Application for Warrant to Seize One 1988 Chevrolet Monte
Carlo, 861 F.2d 307 (1st Cir. 1988).
55. See id.
56. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 2-1 (1998).
57. See Good, 510 U.S. at 59. See also 18 U.S.C. § 985(c) (2000).
58. See Good, 510 U.S. at 58. See also 18 U.S.C. § 981(c)(1) (2000).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(3) (2000).
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the government's rights have been determined at the judicial
hearing.'
2. The Judicial Hearing-The formal judicial forfeiture
proceedings are initiated by filing a complaint against the
property.61 The Rules provide for the contents of the complaint
which include, inter alia, the basis of the court's jurisdiction, date of
seizure if applicable, allegation of the forfeitability of the property,
and a request for relief.62  Assuming that the complaint is
answered,63 the government may commence civil discovery pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6'
Before the Reform Act, civil forfeiture actions required the
government merely to prove probable cause that the property was
forfeitable; the burden then shifted to the claimant owner to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the property should not be
forfeited.65  Judgment was entered for the government or the
claimant and the property was either forfeited or promptly returned
to the claimant.'
The Reform Act has instituted a multitude of changes in this
procedure and most significantly in the area of burden of proof.
67
The government is now required to prove by a preponderance of
60. See Good, 510 U.S. at 58 (1993). This, however, does not eliminate the
need for the government to obtain jurisdiction and control over the res. See id.
61. See Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule
C(2).
62. See id. at C(2), E(2)(a).
63. See FED. R. CIv. P. 55 (noting that default judgment may be sought in a
civil proceeding if a cognizable response is not filed within 30 days).
64. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 4-43 - 4-74 (1998)
(noting that the full gamut of civil discovery is available in civil forfeiture
proceedings including, inter alia, requests for documents, admissions, and motions
to compel discovery). This is a practical allowance because it permits the
government to decide whether to move for summary judgment, proceed to trial, or
settle the case. See id. at 4-43. This has the effect of conserving judicial resources
and holds with the judicial fiction that the property is considered the offender and
that the action is civil, rather than criminal, in nature.
65. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1999). The Supreme Court upheld this
procedure under Constitutional attack. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
634-5 (1886). This is so because the statutes are only quasi-criminal. See United
States v. One Parcel ... 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1996)
(noting that the forfeiture statutes are "not criminal enough to prevent Congress
from imposing the burden of proof on the claimant").
66. See ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL, 4-111 - 4-113
(1998).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2000). Many of the reforms, such as the innocent
owner defense, the allowance of damages for damages to seized property, and a
new statute of limitations, are beyond the scope of this comment. For a good
overview of the reforms see Smith, supra note 3.
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the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.' Moreover,
if the theory underlying the forfeiture is that the property "was
used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was
involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government
shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the
property and the offence. '
The Reform Act provides for legal counsel in certain
situations." In the case of a forfeiture of real property that is used
as the primary residence of the claimant, "the court, at the request
of the person, shall insure that the person is represented by an
attorney for Legal Services Corporation with respect to the claim."'"
3. The Fictional "Guilty Property" and the Theory That
Underlies a Forfeiture Action-The government's interests in
forfeitable property arise at the time a crime is committed that
involves the property. This doctrine, commonly known as the
"relation back doctrine," is important to the govern-ment's claim.73
The forfeiture proceedings merely perfect the government's rights
that arose at the time of the commission of the criminal act. 4 The
timing of the seizure, therefore, had no effect on the substantive
right of the government to forfeit the property. 5
Before the Reform Act, this doctrine protected the
government's rights to forfeit the property from intermediate sales
and transfers, even to bona fide purchasers for value.76 Now,
however, because of a unified innocent owner defense enacted in
the Reform Act, various innocent property owners are protected
68. See id. § 983(c)(1). The government is free to meet this burden with
evidence gathered after the filing of the complaint. See id. § 983(c)(2).
69. See id. § 983(c)(3).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000).
71. See id. § 983(b)(2)(A).
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (2000). See also United
States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 1617 (1890) (noting that "the forfeiture takes effect
immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property then vests in
the United States, although their title is not perfected until judicial condemnation
... the condemnation.., relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate
sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith").
73. See Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17 (noting that the relation back doctrine
effectively avoids all intermediate sales and alienations). As noted below, this
doctrine has lost some of its teeth with the enactment of the Reform Act.
74. See id. See also United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door
Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983).
75. See id. The conviction of the perpetrator of the underlying offence has no
bearing on whether the property may be forfeited. See Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) ("It is the property which is
proceeded against ... The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal
offense.").
76. See Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17.
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from forfeiture." Even in the light of this reform, the underlying
theory remains that the government's interests arise at the time of
the commission of the offence."
III. The Watershed Decision: United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property 78
A. Factual Background: The Drug Offense
In Good the Court addressed whether the "Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil
forfeiture case from seizing real property without first affording the
owner notice and an opportunity to be heard., 79 The offending
property had been seized" because a search warrant of the property
had revealed marijuana and other drug-related materials and
paraphernalia.81 The government obtained a warrant based on an
affidavit, which warrant was executed against the property three
days later." The hearing was ex parte and the owner of the home
was not given an opportunity to present evidence as to why the
property should not be seized.83 The government allowed the
tenants, who were renting the property, to remain; future rent
payments, however, were to be directed to the government.8
B. Procedural History: Seizure Before the Adversarial Hearing
Good, the owner of the property, claimed that the seizure pur-
suant to a warrant obtained in an ex parte hearing had violated his
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2000) ("An innocent owner's interest shall not
be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute."). The claimant must prove he is an
innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The statute provides
a very detailed list of criteria for meeting the innocent owner standard. See
generally 18 U.S.C. § 981(d).
78. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
79. See id. at 46.
80. The property was seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). This statute permits
the forfeiture of real property for a violation of Title 21. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1999).
81. See Good, 510 U.S. at 46.
82. See id. at 47.
83. See id.
84. See id. The redirection of rent payments demonstrates the importance of
the seizure and how pervasive its effects are on the rights of the owners. See id.
("It [the seizure] gives the Government not only the right to prohibit sale, but also
the right to evict occupants, to modify the property, to condition occupancy, to
receive rents, and to supersede the owner in all rights pertaining [to the
property] .... ).
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Due Process rights.85 The District Court held that the seizure did
not violate such rights and granted summary judgment to the
government; the Court of Appeals, however, overruled and held in
Good's favor." Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the
Respondent's Due Process rights had been violated.'
C. Reasoning of the Majority: Seizure Before Notice and
Opportunity Violates Due Process Rights
The majority opinion,' written by Justice Kennedy, responded
to two primary arguments asserted by the government as just-
ification for the prehearing seizure of real property in forfeiture
cases.89 First, the government argued that compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, by obtaining a warrant based on probable
cause, was satisfactory for all Constitutional purposes.' Second, the
government asserted that the drug forfeiture laws justified an
exception to the Due Process Clause.91 The majority concluded that
without a showing of exigent circumstances real property could not
85. See Good, 510 U.S. at 47. Good also claimed that the forfeiture action was
invalid because it had not been commenced in a timely matter. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 47-8.
88. Part I of the decision was the factual background and was joined by all
Justices of the Court. See id. at 46-48. In Part II, Justice Kennedy addressed the
Due Process claims. See id. at 48-62. In this part of the decision Justice Kennedy
was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. See Good, 510
U.S. at 46. The dissenters as to Part II were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas. See id. The Court was unanimous on the
timeliness issue noted above which was Part III of the decision. See id. at 46, 63-
65. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas
turned in vehement dissents to the Due Process decision in Part II, with arguments
that strike hard at the majority's reasoning, they are generally beyond the scope of
the analysis of this comment. Thus, they will be noted when appropriate as
tangential issues in order to provide perspective and critique of the majority
opinion.
89. See id. at 48-62. The government conceded that the prehearing seizure of
the property deprived the owner of interests protected by the Fifth Amendment.
See id. at 49.
90. See Good, 510 U.S. at 49. The Fourth Amendment provides that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.IV.
95. See Good, 510 U.S. at 49. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V.
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be seized without fully satisfying the requirements of the Due
Process Clause.9
The majority first held that Fourth Amendment requirements
were not satisfactory for all purposes. Instead the "proper
question" was whether either the Fourth or the Fifth Amendment
had been violated exclusive of the other.93 The Court rejected the
government's comparison to Fourth Amendment cases dealing with
the arrest and detention of criminal suspects because those cases
included procedural safeguards that are inapplicable to forfeiture
cases.94  Moreover, the majority noted that previous cases
demonstrated a rejection by the Court of the notion that one
Constitutional guarantee necessarily pre-empts the requirements of
another.95 The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment "does
not provide the sole measure of constitutional protection that must
be afforded property owners in forfeiture proceedings. 96
The Court continued its analysis of the government's seizure,
and whether it could be considered an exception to the Due Process
Clause requirements, in light of the previous decision in Calero-
Toledo.97 The decision had permitted the seizure of a yacht without
predeprivation notice or hearing.98 The Good majority noted that
real property could not be forfeited under the laws in effect at the
time of Calero-Toledo decision.99 Also important to the Calero-
Toledo Court's reasoning was the inherent mobility of a yacht.1°°
92. See Good, 510 U.S. at 62.
93. See id. at 50.
94. See id. at 50-51
95. See id. at 49-52. The Court did, however, note that the provisions of one
guarantee could settle the issue. See id. at 51. Calero-Toledo was cited by the
majority because it examined an ex parte forfeiture proceeding in light of the Due
Process Clause; thus, past jurisprudence demonstrates the Court's tendency to
analyze forfeiture decisions in this light. See Good, 510 U.S. at 51 (citing Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
96. See Good, 510 U.S. at 52. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent would have
found the Fourth Amendment as the benchmark in civil forfeiture proceedings.
See id. at 67 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) ("Compliance with the standards and
procedures prescribed by the Fourth Amendment constitutes all the 'Process' that
is 'due' to respondent Good under the Fifth Amendment in the forfeiture
context.").
97. United States v. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
98. See id. at 679-680.
99. See Good, 510 U.S. at 53. Real property was not permitted to be forfeited
until ten years later. See id.
100. See id. at 52. Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the Court in Calero-
Toledo considered two other factors besides inherent mobility: public interest and
initiation of the seizure by disinterested public officials. See id. at 71-72
(Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
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Real property, conversely, is stationary and cannot easily be
transported to another jurisdiction. 1
The majority applied a three-part test, gleaned from Matthews
v. Eldridge, in determining whether an exception to the Due
Process requirements was appropriate in these cases.' 3  First,
private interests affected by the official action are considered."°
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests, and the
corresponding probable value of additional safeguards, are
analyzed."' Finally, the Government's interest, including the
administrative burdens imposed, must be weighed.'
The Court characterized an owner's interest in the home as "a
private interest of historic and continuing importance."'0'7 A seizure
leaves the owner without recourse until a future unspecified
hearing."° The Court considered Good's rental of the home to
tenants of little importance and concluded that "the private
interests at stake in the seizure of real property weigh heavily in the
Matthews balance."'09
The ex parte proceeding was found to create an "unacceptable
risk of error" by its very nature." As the state stands to benefit
financially if the property is found forfeitable, an adversarial
hearing is all the more important to achieving a just outcome."'
101. See id. at 52. The majority noted that the decision would "apply to real
property in general, not simply to residences." See id. at 61. Both Justice
O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist query the majority's reliance on the
immobility of real property. See id. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) ("And while
not being capable of being moved or concealed, the real property at issue here
could be destroyed or damaged... to prevent them [buildings and the like] from
falling into the hands of the Government if prior notice were required."); see also
Good, 510 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
103. See Good, 510 U.S. at 53. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent his
rejection of this test as the benchmark. See id. at 66-67 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
(noting that the Court has explicitly rejected that this is a universal test for all Due
Process cases and that the court's precedent in the civil forfeiture context should
control).
104. See id. at 53.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 53.
107. See Good, 510 U.S. at 53-54. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent questioned
this characterization the Government may deny a person their rights personal to
liberty through an ex parte proceeding when officials are procuring a warrant to
arrest an individual based on probable cause, but property rights could not be
denied by the same procedure. See id. at 46 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
108. See id. at 54.
109. See id. at 54-55.
110. See id. at 55.
111. See id. at 55-56.
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Finally, the Court found that the very nature of real property
made arguments of exigency fallacious. 112  Although the rule
traditionally had been that seizure was necessary to establish
jurisdiction and control, with real property the appropriate forum
could be found without actual seizure. 1 13 A simple posting of the
real property brings the property within the constructive control of
the court and ensures that the property is not sold, destroyed, or
otherwise used for illegal purposes before a determination of the
government's interests.1
4
Therefore, the majority concluded that the government must
provide pre-seizure notice and opportunity to be heard before any
seizure of real property. "
D. The Reform Act: The Legislative Version of Good
The Reform Act codified the Good decision in Section 985.116
All civil forfeitures of real property or interests in real property are
required to proceed as judicial forfeitures under the Act."7 The
section explicitly provides that "real property that is the subject of a
civil forfeiture action shall not be seized before entry of an order of
112. See id. at 56-57. The Court here revisited the Calero-Toledo arguments of
inherent mobility. See id. Early cases permitting the seizure of real property
without prior notice and opportunity to be heard were distinguished on the basis of
"executive urgency." See id. at 60-1 (noting the rationale behind permitting
seizures during wartime and collecting taxes). These cases form a strong argument
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent that the government has long permitted the
seizure of property by ex parte proceedings. See Good, 510 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist,
C.J. dissenting). Similarly, Justice O'Connor found incredible the majority's
distinctions of real and personal property as the foundation for the decision. See
id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) ("But that distinction [between real and
personal] has never been considered constitutionally relevant in our forfeiture
cases.").
113. See id. at 57.
114. See id. at 58. The government can file a lis pendens, in order to protect the
title and prevent transfer, and can file for a restraining order if the situation
requires. See id. This comment differentiates between judicial forum and control
because the Court in Good seemed to take the same approach. See id. at 57-58.
The Court first held that seizure was unnecessary to establish the appropriate
forum, and then held that constructive control through posting was appropriate.
See id.
115. See Good, 510 U.S. at 62. The Court premised its holding on the lack of
the showing of exigent circumstances by the government. See id.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 985 (2000).
117. Id. § 985(a).
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forfeiture. 118 Moreover, the provisions of Good were enacted as
follows:
The Government shall initiate a civil forfeiture action against
real property by -
(A) filing a complaint for forfeiture;
(B) posting a notice of the complaint on the property; and
(C) serving notice on the property owner, along with a copy
of the complaint." 9
The section also provides for constructive service if the owner of
the property is a fugitive, resides outside the United States and
cannot be served, or "cannot be located in the exercise of due
diligence. 12 1 If these appropriate steps for constructive service are
taken, jurisdiction is established over the res.
121
The section also provides for an exigent circumstances
exception: if the government is able to show that a warrant and
seizure are needed to protect the property, then the warrant may be
issued ex parte Also, an umbrella provision states that real
property may seized after notice is provided to the court before
trial and the court "issues a notice of application for warrant, causes
the notice to be served on the property owner and posted on the
property, and conducts a hearing in which the property owner has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.',
3
IV. A Good Violation: What was the Appropriate Remedy
Before the Reform Act?
The Court in Good did not pass on the appropriate remedy if
the government failed to provide notice and opportunity before
118. 18 U.S.C. § 985(b)(1)(A) (2000). Furthermore, the statute provides that
"the owners or occupants of the real property shall not be evicted from, or
otherwise deprived of the use an enjoyment of, real property that is the subject of
a pending forfeiture action." Id. § 985(b)(1)(B).
119. Id. § 985(c)(1).
120. See id. § 985 (c)(2). Constructive service is made under the rules of the
"laws of the State in which the property is located." Id.
121. See id. § 985(c)(3).
122. See id. § 985(d)(1)(ii). The definition of "exigent circumstances" is
provided. See id. § 985(d)(2)(providing that seizure must be necessaiy to prevent
"the sale, destruction, or continued unlawful use of the real property").
Presumably, this provision relies on the language of the Good Court which seemed
to allow for an exigent circumstances exception. See United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1993).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 985(d)(1)(i) (2000).
[Vol. 105:1
2000] FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES 145
seizure," and the circuits split on the appropriate remedy. The
background on civil in rem forfeiture including the enactment of
the Reform Act, the procedure of a forfeiture case, and the Court's
reasoning in Good, provide a solid foundation from which to
analyze the competing interpretations.
Four possible remedies could address a governmental failure to
comply with Good's requirements. The first alternative is to give
the owner of the property damages in the form of lost use, rent
revenue, and other pecuniary loss. 125 As was noted above, the
government seizure of real property has a pervasive effect on the
property rights of the owner.26  Moreover, it is worth re-
emphasizing that the owner of the seized property may be
prevented from retaking control of that property. 27
A second alternative is to suppress evidence discovered as a
128 thdirect result of the wrongful seizure. On the surface this justifi-
cation would seem founded on the theory of a Fourth Amendment
violation and the exclusionary rule. 9 Several courts combine this
remedy with damages.3'
The third alternative is dismissal of the complaint with leave to
re-file if the applicable statute of limitations has not expired. 3' In
124. Instead, the case was simply "remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion." See Good, 510 U.S. at 65.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property Located at 20832 Big Rock Drive,
51 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The Government is held responsible for any
rents accrued during the illegal seizure." (internal quotations omitted)). The term
"wrongfully deprived" speaks not to the "innocence" or "guilt" of the property,
and the related issue of forfeitability, but only to the issue of the Due Process
violation.
126. See Good, 510 U.S. at 47 ("The Government permitted the tenants to
remain on the premises subject to an occupancy agreement, but directed the
payment of future rents to the United States Marshall.").
127. See, e.g., United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, 66 F.3d 1164, 1165
(11th Cir. 1995) ("The government then [after receiving warrants for arrest,]
executed process on the properties and changed the locks on an uninhabited home
situated on the one developed property.").
128. See, e.g., United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, Roswell, New
Mexico, 17 F.3d 1306, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The illegality of the seizure,
however, does not necessarily invalidate the forfeiture. The judgment of forfeiture
may still stand, so long as impermissibly obtained evidence is not used in the
forfeiture proceeding." (quoting United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989)) (citations omitted)).
129. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1961).
130. See, e.g., 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d at 1316.
131. See, e.g., United States of America v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, 66 F.3d
1164, 1167 (11th Cir. 1995).
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the period before the Reform Act, the statute of limitations was
five years from the time the alleged offense was "discovered.
13 2
The fourth alternative, and one not approved by any court, is
dismissal of the government's complaint without leave to re-file.
Each of these alternatives will be discussed.
A. Minority View: Dismissal with Leave to Re-file
A minority of circuits addressing the issue adopted the third
alternative listed above: the case is dismissed with leave to re-file if
the statute of limitations has not expired. "3 In United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights3 4 the
government failed to provide Long, the owner of property that was
alleged to have facilitated his sale of cocaine, with notice and
opportunity to be heard before seizing his property.'35  The
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal in deciding the
appropriate remedy was surprisingly short: "The lack of notice and
a hearing prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant for the seizure
of the Long residence renders that warrant invalid and
unconstitutional. Because the seizure was conducted pursuant to
an invalid warrant, we must dismiss this forfeiture action."'36
If the government never had a right to seize the property, and
therefore assert actual control over that property, then that cause of
action is invalid because it is premised on an unlawful and invalid
action. These courts agree that the action may be re-filed if the
statutory time constraints permit."'
132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1999). The Reform Act has modified the statute to
run two years after the time the involvement of the property in the offense is
discovered, or five years after the time the alleged offense is discovered, whichever
is later. See 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
133. The Eighth Circuit is the only Court of Appeals that accepts this
reasoning. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638
Chicago Heights, St. Louis, Missouri, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994). The District
Court for the District of Columbia has also adopted this minority view. See United
States v. Property Identified as Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.2d 27, 39 (D.D.C.
1998).
134. 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994).
135. See id. at 328. This decision was pending appeal when the Supreme Court
decided Good. See id. at 329.
136. See 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d at 330. The Courts adhering to the
minority view expend much more analysis explaining the inadequacies of the
majority view. See, e.g., Property Identified as Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp. 2d.
at 39-41. These arguments will be discussed in Part IV-C.
137. See 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d. at 330; accord Property Identified as Lot
Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.2d. at 40 (noting that the provision for re-filing
"harmonizes with the rationale other circuits have used to reject the dismissal
remedy").
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B. Majority View: Suppression Plus Damages
A majority of circuits addressing the issue have decided that
the government must pay damages for the wrongful seizure, have
any evidence seized during the wrongful seizure suppressed, or a
combination of the two.138
In reasoning to this result, these courts first look to the
following foundation: "The illegality of the seizure .. .does not
necessarily invalidate the forfeiture."139  This proposition is
extracted from the Second Circuit decision of United States v. The
Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Rd.140 In this pre-
Good decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
the government's seizure of the real property at issue was a
violation of the owner's Due Process rights.'41
Although the 4492 South Livonia Rd. decision predicted the
outcome of the Good majority, the citations supporting the
proposition that an illegal seizure does not invalidate the forfeiture
are less than satisfactory. 14 2  All the cases cited are pre-Good
decisions that deal with moveable personal property.143 Despite this
paltry foundation, this proposition forms the basis of many majority
138. These jurisdictions are comprised of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 927, 931-32
(4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Real Property Located at 1184 Drycreek Rd.,
43023, 174 F.3d 720, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. All Assets and
Equipment of West Side Building Corp, 58 F.3d 1181, 1193 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Real Property Located at 20832 Big Rock Drive, 51 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1315-16 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. 408 Peyton Road, 162 F.3d 644, 652 (11th Cir. 1998).
139. See United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th
Cir. 1994).
140. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
141. See id. at 1262-66. This reasoning was talismanic of the Supreme Court's
later decision Good. See id.
142. See id. at 1265-66. The Court cites the following cases: United States v.
One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the warrantless seizure of an automobile did not "jeopardize the
government's right to secure forfeiture if the probable cause to seize the vehicle
can be supported with untainted evidence"); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac
Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450-51 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that an automobile used in
connection with gambling, thus violating the internal revenue laws, was forfeitable
even though the government seized the automobile without a warrant: "a prior
unauthorized seizure of the object did not preclude a valid forfeiture"); United
States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that warrantless seizure of a motorcycle did not invalidate the seizure so
long as requirements proven without evidence untainted by the seizure). See id.
143. See, supra, footnote 143 (indicating the personal property and dates of the
cases cited in 4492 Livonia Road).
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decisions." These opinions fail to cite to any more concrete basis
for their holding than that alluded to in the 4492 South Livonia
Road opinion.
After holding the forfeiture action viable, the courts then state
that the government is precluded from using any evidence resulting
from the illegal seizure. As above, the courts often cite 4492
South Livonia Road and its progeny for this proposition. Also,
many add the "additional twist" that the government be held liable
for any rents or profits that may have accrued during the illegal
seizure.146 The addition of damages is reasoned "an effective, but
measured, remedy for the violation of the claimant's rights.
1 47
The time period for which the damages are to be paid is the
time between the illegal seizure and when the claimant is afforded
Due Process rights at an adversarial hearing.'" Thus, in United
States v. Marsh,14 when a summary judgment motion was heard by
the magistrate, there was no doubt that this hearing satisfied the
requirements established by Good.5'
C. A Fourth Option: Dismissal with Prejudice?
It is necessary to discuss, for the sake of completeness, a fourth
option that has not been subscribed to by any court: that the
complaint be dismissed without opportunity to re-file. An
argument for this view is found in another context and in a
dissenting opinion. In One 1975 Pontiac Lemans,15 1 the government
144. See, e.g., Marsh, 105 F.3d at 931 ("[A] Good-violative seizure does not
immunize the property from forfeiture."); All Assets and Equipment of West Side
Building Corp., 58 F.3d at 1193 ("[T]he illegal seizure does not, standing alone,
require that the property be immune from forfeiture."); 51 Pieces of Real Property,
17 F.3d at 1315 ("The illegality of the seizure, however, does not necessarily
invalidate the forfeiture.").
145. See, e.g., 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d at 1316; United States v. The
Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livona Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1983).
146. See, e.g., Real Property Located at 20832 Big Rock Drive, 51 F.3d 1402,
1406 (9th Cir. 1995).
147. See United States v. All Assets and Equipment of West Side Building
Corp., 58 F.3d 1181, 1194 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Marsh, 105 F.3d at 931 ("The
circuits not dismissing the action have tailored the remedy in a fashion
commensurate with the violation of the rights of the claimant [by granting
damages]....").
148. See Marsh, 105 F.3d at 932 (noting that when the claimant "received an
adversarial hearing on the forfeiture, she had received all the process that was
due...").
149. 105 F.3d 927 (4th Cir. 1997).
150. See id.
151. 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
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seized an automobile believed to have been used for illegal
gambling in violation of tax laws. 52 The automobile was "seized...
without a warrant from a public street."'53 The majority opinion
held that the government's seizure of the car without a warrant did
not invalidate the forfeiture."
The dissent, by Chief Judge Coffin, argued that the not only
should the evidence found pursuant to the illegal seizure be
excluded, but that the government should lose its cause of action
against that piece of property.' The reasoning is founded on the
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy,
the primary purpose of which is to deter unconstitutional police
conduct."5 6 The exclusionary rule mandates that "property obtained
as a result of an illegal search and seizure should be returned to a
person entitled to lawful possession and may not be used in any
subsequent criminal proceeding." '157
Chief Judge Coffin reasoned by analogy that the government
should be barred in the case of an illegal seizure in the forfeiture
context. 58 The "exclusion" of the property from any further pro-
ceedings because of the illegality of the actions of the government
strikes an appropriate balance between societal and governmental
needs. 59 Only by insulating the property from further action can
the Constitutional rights of the citizenry be protected."6 Thus, this
152. See id. at 446-47.
153. See id. at 447.
154. See id. at 450-51. As noted above, this case was cited in support of the
majority view as found in 4492 South Livonia Road. See United States v. Premises
and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1265-66 (2d Cir.
1989).
155. See One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d at 458-59 (Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
Although this dissent is written in the case of a warrantless seizure of an
automobile, its reasoning is even more applicable in the context of a seizure of real
property and in light of Good.
156. See id. at 458 (citing the Supreme Court decision of Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486 (1976) for the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule).
157. See id. at 459.
158. See id. at 459 ("It appears to me, therefore, both permissible and
reasonable to treat forfeiture cases as what they are sui generis and ... [apply the
exclusionary rule the same way].").
159. See id.
160. See id. The majority had this to say about the dissent's reasoning:
Our colleague's [Coffin's] rule would deprive the government of a vehicle
whose forfeit character is fully proven by untainted evidence simply, it
appears, to punish the government for failing to get the warrant to which,
as the outcome of the forfeiture case shows, it would have been entitled
all along.
See id. at 451.
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"social cost" is a small price to pay to ensure that the government
complies with the Due Process requirements.16'
D. Analysis of the Competing Rationales
Each of the three major solutions will be examined in turn.
This comment will conclude that although the majority decisions
are not particularly well-reasoned, the proper remedy for a Good
violation is the imposition of damages and the suppression of any
evidence recovered. This stems from the fact that the minority
reasoning suffers from a fatal flaw: it wrongly premises the
government's cause of action on the seizure of the property.
1. Right for the Wrong Reasons: The Majority's Underlying
Proposition That the Forfeiture Action is Not Destroyed by the
Good Violation-It seems appropriate to begin a comparison of the
rationales with a consideration of the majority's underlying
proposition.162 The majority's proposition that the forfeiture right
of action is not destroyed by an inappropriate seizure is founded
upon the wrong law.'63 The cases cited by 4492 Livonia Road dealt
with personal property that was readily movable.' 6' Those cases,
without going too much beyond the scope of this comment, were
wrongly decided. The theory of forfeiture is that the government's
cause of action must be based upon the bringing movable property
within the control and jurisdiction of the court.165 Seizure of the
property establishes actual control over the property of the court,
as well as establishes the proper judicial forum. If the property was
not brought within the court's jurisdiction and control, the action
should have been dismissed sua sponte. 166
What changes with the opinion in Good is that real property
need not be seized in order to establish control over the property.
167
161. See id. at 459 (Coffin, C.J. dissenting).
162. See, supra notes 139-144 for a discussion of this underlying presumption.
163. See United States v. The Premises and Real Property at 4492 South
Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1983).
164. See id.
165. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 57
(1993) (noting that "seizure of the res has long been considered a prerequisite to
the initiation of in rem forfeiture proceedings..."); ASSET FORFEITURE LAW AND
PRACTICE MANUAL, 2-1 (1998).
166. The response of the One 1975 Pontiac Lemans majority, noted supra in
footnote 160, is clearly inadequate. See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac
Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 451(1st Cir. 1980). The jurisdiction and control of the court
is the appropriate question; without that prerequisite the court has no authority to
pass on the guilt of the property.
167. See Good, 510 U.S. at 57-58.
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The Court explained, quoting Justice Story, the reasoning for
requiring seizure for movable personal property: "Before judicial
cognizance can attach upon a forfeiture in rem,.., there must be a
seizure; for until a seizure it is impossible to ascertain what is the
competent forum."1" When the property is real, this reasoning
loses its potency: "the appropriate judicial forum may be deter-
mined without actual seizure." '69 Moreover, constructive control is
established by posting the property and providing notice to the
owners.
Thus, the difference between real and personal property makes
valid the majority's proposition that the action is not lost by the
government's failure to comply with Good. However, the
reasoning and caselaw depended upon by the courts are unavailing.
This is so because the forum is easily ascertainable and control is
necessarily established.
2. Dismissal of the Cause of Action: A Misunderstanding of
the Reason for the Warrant-The minority decisions requiring the
dismissal of the cause of action are invalid for the reasons cited
immediately above. 70 The government's cause of action against
real property is simply no longer premised on the seizure of that
property.171 As long as the property has otherwise been brought
within the court's constructive control, through the posting and
notice as outlined in Good,7 2 then the reviewing court should
fashion a remedy as indicated below. Therefore, it is irrelevant that
the warrant is "invalid and unconstitutional' 7 3 because the real
property is obviously within the court's judicial reach and the
posting establishes the necessary control.
On a practical level, the minority conclusion provides little
effective relief to the harmed property owner. The statute of
limitations was then five years;74 by permitting the re-filing of the
action the courts vitiate any real consequences of the government's
unconstitutional action. The wronged owner could simply petition
the district court to dismiss the cause of action. Afterwards the
168. See id. at 57 (quoting The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. 289 (1815)).
169. See id. at 57.
170. This discussion is equally applicable to the remedy that would dismiss the
cause of action without permission to re-file: it is simply premised on the wrong
reasons.
171. See Good, 510 U.S. at 57-58.
172. See id.
173. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago
Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994).
174. See 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1999). See supra, note 132, for the current statute of
limitations.
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government could promptly and properly post the property and re-
file the action. The legal resources of the government far surpass
even the most extraordinary citizen, making the extra petition much
more of a burden on the property owner.'75
More difficult is the question of the inadequacy of the other
remedies. The District of Columbia District Court noted: "Given
the substantial powers that civil forfeiture laws vest in the govern-
ment ... the remedy of dismissal is commensurate with the offense
[of a Due Process violation]."'76  Given the broad powers of the
courts to fashion remedies, this may be a difficult reason with which
to quibble. But, as noted above, the dismissal remedy really affords
only temporary relief if the government is given leave to re-file.
3. Suppression of Evidence: The Most Effective Deterrent for
Law Enforcement-The suppression of any evidence that may be
found in a warrantless seizure will provide some relief to an
owner.'77 This is not an ordinary application of the exclusionary
rule because the Fourth Amendment can be satisfied by a probable
cause hearing before a local magistrate. However, if the govern-
ment indeed found evidence that tended to prove the forfeitability
of the property by the illegal seizure, the exclusion of such evidence
could strike a meaningful blow. It is rational in the sense that if the
government did not have a right to be in possession of the property,
it should not be permitted to use its ill-gotten evidence at trial.'78
The problem with this remedy is that it offers limited
consolation in certain contexts. For example, in Property Identified
as Lot 17, the government's cause of action was based on the belief
that the property had been purchased with illegal funds. 179 The
illegal seizure of such property is unlikely to result in the
confiscation of other evidence that would support the forfeiture
cause of action." Suppression is effective, however, in many cases.
175. This problem, of course, could be alleviated by imposing costs on the
government.
176. United States v. Property Identified as Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp. 2d
27, 40 (D.D.C. 1998). This comment is on the heels of a discussion as to why the
majority remedy is inadequate. See id. These reasons will be discussed post haste
in the following sections.
177. The majority requires the forfeitability of the property to be proven
without reference to any evidence that was procured by the illegal seizure. See,
e.g., United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir.
1994).
178. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (discussing the
exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment).
179. See United States v. Property Identified as Lot Numbered 718, 20 F. Supp.
2d 27, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1998); see also 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(1)(A) (1999).
180. See Property Identified as Lot 718, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
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Moreover, it is noted that the seizure in the forfeiture context
is meant to assert a possessory interest over the property and is not
usually accomplished to find evidence. 8' Thus, it is argued, the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary remedy cannot provide effective
relief.82 Admittedly, the government's action goes beyond that
normally thought of as a Fourth Amendment violation. However,
the exclusionary remedy may in fact be the most devastating
remedy currently used by any jurisdiction. Damages and dismissal
with permission to re-file simply do not strike at the offending
official's consciousness as his pocketbook is unlikely affected.
Knowing that evidence of wrongdoing could be suppressed,
however, would seemingly make even the most ambitious officer
pause.
Therefore, although not effective in all forfeiture cases, the
suppression of evidence provides a valid and effective means to
control law enforcement's violation of Good.
4. Damages for Lost Use: Placing the Owner in His Former
Position-The purpose of the damages remedy is to place the
claimant in the position she would have occupied without the
unconstitutional seizure.183 Although unlikely to really pull at the
purse strings of the government, the damages remedy does afford a
wronged owner some relief for an unconstitutional seizure. At the
very least, the claimant will not be worse off than she was before
the seizure.
A criticism of this remedy is that the return of rents has no
validity if the property in question is owner-occupied.' Moreover,
to broadly formulate lost enjoyment in these situations presents
serious problems of how to quantify such a loss.' But, if the
government has not dispossessed the owner, perhaps no remedy is
in order as this is likely no more invasive than posting. In Good,
the rents from the property had been redirected toward the govern-
ment.186 Thus, the owner had suffered a loss. A technical violation
of the requirements that leads to no real injury, or the claimant
181. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 52
(1993) ("The purpose and effect of the Government's action in the present case go
beyond the traditional meaning of search and seizure. Here the Government
seized property not to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, but to assert ownership
and control over the property itself.").
182. See Property Identified as Lot 17, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
183. See United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 976 F. Supp.
1327, 1348 (D. Nev. 1997).
184. See Property Identified as Lot 17, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
185. See id.
186. See Good, 510 U.S. at 47.
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being worse off, provides no cause of action to entitle the owner to
any recourse.
An example illustrates this idea. Suppose that the government
obtained a warrant to seize a particular piece of property that was
believed to have been purchased with illegal funds. The govern-
ment executes this warrant and "seizes" the property, but the
owner is permitted to remain. Four months later, during which
time the owner was permitted to remain and the government
exerted no control over the owner's rights, an adversarial hearing is
held. The owner has suffered no legally recognizable harm because
she is no worse off than if the government had simply filed a lis
pendens and posted the property. Certainly this situation changes
when the owner is dispossessed, or otherwise harmed by a
pecuniary loss.
Thus, damages strikes a balance that readily compensates any
harm that might have befallen the owner of an illegally dispossessed
property.
V. The Reform Act's Position... or Nonposition
The Reform Act has several provisions that will have some
impact on the appropriate Good violation remedy. First, the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") was amended to waive sover-
eign immunity for property seized under any forfeiture law, when
the interest was not forfeited, and the claimant was not convicted of
any crime." Second, another provision entitles a claimant who
"substantially prevails" in a civil forfeiture proceeding to recover
reasonable attorney fees, reasonable litigation costs, and post-
judgment interest.'9
Thus, it would seem clear that if the government seized real
property without proper notice and opportunity, the owner would
be entitled to sue for compensation under the FTCA for damages.
However, it would be more difficult to demonstrate that the owner
"substantially prevail[ed]" on those facts alone. This language,
though undefined, seems to be directed toward frivolous
proceedings, rather than faulty procedure.
It is slightly more difficult to predict what effect the Reform
Act will have if an illegal seizure took place. Section 983(a)(1)(A)
provides for written notice to any interested parties after a seizure
in a nonjudicial forfeiture "as soon as practicable, and in no case
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (2000).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
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more than 60 days after the date of the seizure."' 9  A separate
provision states that if this notice is not provided to the interested
parties "the Government shall return the property to that person
without prejudice to the right of the Government to commence a
forfeiture proceeding at a later time."' 9
Although this seems to accept the minority position, it is
probably inapplicable. First, it addresses only nonjudicial forfei-
tures; all real property interests are forfeited by judicial forfeiture. 9'
Moreover, it assumes a proper seizure because the first provision
provides for notice of seizure to interested parties, and the latter a
return of the property to the person from whom it was seized.9
The violation lies in the government's failure to give notice rather
than an improper seizure. Thus, this section does not address the
appropriate remedy for a Good violation.
This section does present an interesting outlook, however, on
how the reforms may impact the reasoning of the courts. If the
legislature has deemed the failure to provide notice of a proper
seizure of property within a reasonable period of time cause to
dismiss the forfeiture,'93 the statute likely would have provided the
same remedy for the more egregious breach of its specific
provisions that real property not be seized before the proper steps
have been taken.' 94 Thus, the statute provides elements of both the
majority position and the minority position without seeming to
completely endorse either in the context of real property.
The provision relating specifically to the civil forfeiture of real
property does not provide any cognizable remedy.9 Another
provision, however, applies a uniform standard for a motion to set
aside a declaration of forfeiture in which a person entitled to
189. See id. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). This section addresses "any
nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute." See id.
190. See id. § 983(a)(1)(F). However, the government is not "required to return
contraband or other property that the person from whom the property was seized
may not legally possess." See id. This part of the provision will obviously have no
relevance to real property which could not be contrand per se. Note that this
provision works in conjunction with the new, and more lenient, statute of
limitations. See id. § 1621 (linking the statute of limitations to the discovery of the
connection of the property or the discovery of the offense).
191. See id. § 985(a).
192. See id. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). See also id. § 983(a)(1)(F) ("If the Government
does not send notice of a seizure of property in accordance with [§ 983(a)(1)(A)]
to the person from whom the property was seized [the Government must return
the property].").
193. See id. § 983(a)(1)(F). Of course, like the minority position delineated
above, the Government may re-file its claim. See id.
194. See id. § 985(b)-(c).
195. See generally id. § 985.
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written notice does not receive such notice. 96  This section,
however, only addresses improper notice and presumes a valid
seizure and proper procedure.197 Thus, this also addresses only the
improper notice to the aggrieved party and not an invalid seizure of
real property.
Thus, the Reform Act seems to provide minimal guidance to a
person aggrieved by the seizure of real property without proper
notice and opportunity to be heard. Although the addition to the
FTCA provides an alternate damage provision, and the remedy
provisions provide a new layer of argument to such owners, the Act
does not specifically provide the remedy for an invalid forfeiture.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Good has created
considerable controversy over the proper remedy that will fully
protect the government's interest in forfeiting a "guilty" piece of
property, while compensating the owner aggrieved by the Due
Process violation. Although dismissal of the suit seems at first
blush to strike an appropriate balance at first blush, the underlying
rationale of the remedy falls short. The invalidity of the seizure
simply is unimportant to the analysis after Good because
appropriate judicial forum is easily ascertainable and it will be fairly
easy to establish constructive control over the property. However,
the provisions of the Reform Act, coupled with the remedy
provisions addressing a failure to give notice, do add a new
argument for an analogous remedy were the government to breach
the provisions of the Act.
Although damages may not fully compensate every technical
violation of Good, damages place the property owner into the
position occupied before the seizure. Moreover, when combined
with the effective deterrent of suppression of any evidence
recovered, the majority jurisdictions' remedy is effective to assure
the owner's Due Process rights will be protected. These circuits
should continue to apply these appropriate and well-reasoned
remedies even in the light of the Reform Act.
Clinton P. Sanko
196. See id. § 983(e) ("Motion to set aside forfeiture").
197. The statute only addresses the interests of the moving party and does not
set aside the validity of the forfeiture. See id. § 983(e)(1).
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